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11. POLICY PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR 
VACCINES AND THEIR UNCERTAIN SUPPLY
Vaccines have prevented more premature deaths, permanent disability and 
suffering than any other medical discovery or intervention (Andre 2001; Andre, 
Booy et al. 2008:2206). The WHO has estimated that poliomyelitis eradication will 
save governments $1.5bn per year in treatment and rehabilitation costs (Barrett 
2004), whilst the US alone saves the total of all its contributions to the smallpox 
eradication programme every 26 days (Rappuoli, Miller et al. 2002).
However vaccines are not easy to develop. Estimates of the cost of bringing 
a new vaccine to market range from $600m to $800m (Douglas 2004; Plotkin 
2005), with a recent influenza vaccine costing more than $1bn (NIH and NIAID 
2007). Even when greater sums are spent, new vaccines do not necessarily 
emerge. Total global investment in HIV vaccine research and development 
increased to $961m in 2007 (UNAIDS 2008:12); two thirds of leading scientists in 
the field think a vaccine will not be developed in the next ten years (Connor and 
Green 2008).
This hints at the heterogeneity observed in the history of vaccine innovation: 
some vaccines have been developed in a decade, whilst others have eluded 
discovery for over a century (IAVI 2008:14). Explanations of this wide variation 
have often focused on downstream issues related to product innovations. 
Economists for example have emphasised demand-side issues for vaccine 
products (Pauly, Robinson et al. 1995; Esparza, Chang et al. 2003; Farlow 2004) 
or have analysed issues around the trade-offs in vaccine efficacies, costs and 
development times (Tangcharoensathien, Phoolcharoen et al. 2001; Cropper, 
Haile et al. 2004). Sociologists on the other hand have been concerned with anti-
vaccination movements (Blume 2006; Dempsey, Zimet et al. 2006), delivery and 
access (Aston 2001; IOM 2003) and selection of vaccine products (Blume 2005; 
Blume and Zanders 2006).
Explaining why something did not occur is obviously methodologically difficult. 
A focus on downstream issues is not as useful for explaining the non-existence 
of a product, even by comparing with products that do exist. A more appropriate 
analytical approach would involve exploring further upstream in the innovation 
process to trace the unpredictable turns that characterise the evolution of 
knowledge (Nelson 2003), the historical circumstances in which certain research 
paths were taken and others abandoned (Dosi 1982), and the local context in 
which technologies are developed (Rosenberg 1976; 1982). Economic notions of 
market failure and sociological notions of neglected diseases are relatively silent 
on why - for example HIV - vaccine innovation is difficult. HIV vaccine research 
is well funded, has a potential market and is supported by a coalition of prominent 
2social groups1 . This paper provides an alternative explanation that builds 
on theoretical understanding of innovation processes and the history of 
vaccine development.
Consequently, this paper emerges with suggestions for policy in section 4 that are 
intended to complement existing suggestions. Advanced market commitments 
(Kremer, Glennerster et al. 2006), intellectual property incentives (Lanjouw 
2003), public-private partnerships (Chataway, Hanlin et al. 2007) and networking 
incentives (Galambos and Sewell 1995) all rest on the assumption that the disparity 
between vaccine need and supply represents a market failure. Advocates for 
boosting vaccine research funds (Archibugi and Bizzarri 2004) have done much 
to raise awareness of their woeful inadequacy, especially for neglected diseases, 
nonetheless such advocacy rests on assumptions that science can overcome the 
challenges of vaccine innovation largely on its own.
This paper adds to these suggestions the idea that science is not enough: 
vaccinologists must also be able to accumulate technology-specific knowledge. 
For this, policies can significantly facilitate (or hinder) the innovation of vaccines. 
To analyse this idea further, the paper presents a process model of vaccine 
innovation in section 2 and a historical case study in section 3 with which to make 
explicit policy recommendations.
1 Possibly to the neglect of many other important diseases.
32. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 
KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION
The conceptualisation of technology as a multifaceted form of knowledge 
gathered momentum as technology theorists such as Layton (1972; 1974), 
Ferguson (1977; 1992) and Price (1965; 1986) tried to make sense of detailed 
qualitative and analytical histories of technologies, for example radios, bridges, 
aeroplanes, and electrical systems (Aitken 1976; Vincenti and Rosenberg 1978; 
Constant 1980; Hughes 1983). To differing degrees, their explanations drew 
on philosophies of science and knowledge (Polanyi 1958; Popper 1959; Kuhn 
1962; Lakatos 1970) and tended towards the notion that technologies have their 
own social and cognitive processes of development centred around problem-
solving (Laudan 1984). Efforts to set this process in economic and socio-political 
contexts yielded evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982; Pavitt 1999; Consoli and 
Ramlogan 2008) and constructivist frameworks (Winner 1985; Bijker, Hughes et 
al. 1987; Blume 1992).
These process models begin with phenomena that become ‘problematised’ 
(Blume 1992:71). In the context of vaccine innovation, problematisation involves 
bringing together previously unrelated symptoms to coalesce around a disease 
characterisation, which becomes increasingly specific so that the course of life 
(or death) events is more predictable (Rosenberg 2002)2. Social and political 
factors, such as who the disease primarily affects, can draw resources initially, 
but identification and characterisation of a disease-causing agent retains these 
social resources for more persistent vaccine innovation efforts.
Pathogen elucidation and disease construction are guided by the retrospective 
question: ‘how is the disease caused?’ As a question of causality, it is amenable 
to scientific investigation. As causality is established, the guiding question then 
becomes more prospective and overtly technological: ‘how can we intervene 
reliably?’ As Vincenti (1990:209) notes, putative ideas of how the technology 
might work are conceived and subjected to initial testing that constitutes a proof of 
concept, or ‘operational principle’ (how a technology works). The operational 
principle is then developed through a series of carefully structured stages to align 
its characteristics with a socio-economic market (Tidd, Bessant et al. 2009).
The process of diagnosis (Rosenberg 2002) helps direct the development of 
specialised clinical knowledge and plays an important role in generating a vision 
of the technological future (Blume 1992:64-70). Shared expectations help form 
2 Rosenberg (2002:236) argues that disease concepts play a pivotal role in ‘how we organize 
health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define 
and manage deviance’.
4networks, which assist in the mobilisation of resources. As a consequence, 
‘opportunities presented as promises, get accepted and become part of an agenda; 
and are subsequently converted into requirements that guide search processes’ (van 
Lente 1993:198).
Visions help change social problems into more specific technological problems. 
They inform the ‘operational principle’ such that it incorporates non-scientific 
features of knowledge (Polanyi 1958:328). ‘The laws of physics may be used to 
analyse operational principles once they have been devised, and they may even 
help in designing it; they in no way however contain or by themselves imply the 
principle’ (Vincenti 1990:209)3. So, science is often necessary but never sufficient 
for innovation.
As a consequence, the complex technological knowledge needed for vaccine 
innovation cannot be obtained ‘as-is’ from scientific knowledge. Instead, 
technological knowledge has to be specifically generated and accumulated 
through its own dedicated and deliberate steps. Because of the inherent 
complexity, uncertainty and weak theoretical understanding of practice, generating 
technological knowledge involves repeated testing and empirical learning (Pavitt 
1999). The purpose of testing is to align knowledge to the environment where the 
technology will actually be used. This requires varied, measured and controlled 
manipulation of experimental conditions with instruments, skills and experience 
(Nelson 2008c). These allow a series of conditions to be created, that can mark 
milestones or stepping stones in the path to an innovated product.
New operational principles are built up in a series of iterative and recursive steps, 
whilst complex phenomena are broken down and simplified (Nightingale 2000)4. 
This is conducted with a background, tacit knowledge of how an operational 
principle works and whether actors can intervene to create artificial conditions 
more suitable for analysing patterns of behaviour (Nightingale 1997). This involves 
a process of recognising, mapping and theorising patterns of behaviour. Patterns 
of behaviour caused by features of the world that are external to the operational 
principle can be removed, in the mind first (during experimental design) and then 
in reality (experimental set-up). This leaves behind the explanatory factors that 
are of most interest. In this way, the strength and extent of key causal relationships 
can be assessed for their reliability; and the robustness of a new operational 
principle can be extended into practice.
Initial explanations formed in protected and purified laboratory experiments 
may not necessarily remain relevant in the more messy and unpredictable 
3 Similarly, Polanyi (1958:177) states ‘The [scientific] knowledge of a machine as an object 
tells us nothing about it as a machine.’
4 Mahdi (2002) refers to this breakdown of phenomena as problem parsing.
5world outside the laboratory5 (Nightingale 2004). The ability to learn is 
facilitated by modifying and creating simplified conditions, where specific 
causal mechanisms can be isolated and tested (Hacking 1983). However, 
the resulting experimental knowledge needs to be iterated back and 
forth into more complex conditions of application to ensure relevance 
outside the laboratory . Thus, the development of new operational 
principles is permeated by constant trade-offs between conditions that 
facilitate the ease of learning and conditions that are relevant to the 
non-laboratory world.
The ability to tinker with these conditions so that ideas work and become 
operational principles (and conversely, the ability to adjust our ideas for given 
conditions) is important for overall technological development. The impact 
of instrumentalities on knowledge growth has been noted by several scholars 
referring to ‘research technologies’, ‘standardised packages’, ‘epistemic 
machinery’, and ‘thing knowledge’ (Fujimura 1992; Rosenberg 1992; Knorr-Cetina 
1999; Joerges and Shinn 2001; Baird 2004). The impact of instrumentalities 
on technology is being explored, for example in the nano-materials sector 
(Meyer 2001; Olsen 2009); although, why they can have such immense 
impacts on the development process is not directly examined. Nelson (2008a:6) 
argues that the ability to ‘identify, control and replicate’ conditions influences 
progress along technological trajectories. Whilst variable conditions may 
enable learning and the development of theories, this does not, on its 
own, facilitate the development of a technology. Rather it is the intended 
and deliberate manipulation of these conditions with instrumentalities 
(Price 1984:13) to allow the variation and selection of alternative explanations 
(Deutsch 1997).
Instrumentalities (instruments, skills and capabilities) provide a link between 
experiment and application by allowing iteration along intermediate points of 
conditions. Technologies develop as instrumentalities reduce uncertainty by 
winnowing the number of possible explanations for behaviour. This helps select 
out a large proportion of possible explanations. As Deutsch (1997) notes, while 
there are an infinite number of possible explanations for a phenomenon, there are 
only a finite number of actual ones. Most technologies are too complex to explore 
5 When a balance can be struck between the two, Nightingale (2004:1264) refers to such 
environments as ‘artificially purified conditions where theories and the world coincide.’ 
Presenting intermediate conditions as a scale adds to Nelson’s (2008c) concept of offline 
development by indicating that conditions need not be either ‘offline’ or ‘online’; there may, 
in principle, be a continuous spectrum of conditions that lie in between. For example, 
temperature is often part of experimental conditions in biology and biotechnology, but it is 
not a discrete variable that can either be offline or online. It can be held constant or variable, 
but when it is variable it can be more, or less, realistic relative to the designer’s intended 
operating environment of the technology in development.
6unaided, and instrumentalities allow conditions to be created for a subpopulation 
of possible explanations to be selectively explored, analysed and tested. A well 
developed set of instrumentalities allows a more focused set of explanations from 
which to choose, reducing search time and costs.
Instrumentalities help technology to be reliable (in the sense that they function 
repeatedly) and valid (in the sense that they function across varied conditions). 
These selected characteristics of knowledge are implicated when instrumentalities 
allow the creation of a series of intermediate conditions in which realistic sets of 
explanations can be formed. Thus, instrumentalities allow rapid recursion between 
reliability and validity, resulting in ‘strongly corroborated’ but not necessarily ‘true’ 
knowledge (Constant 2000:221).
Learning and innovation can therefore be facilitated by improving the resolving 
power of instrumentalities, such that they increase the number of intermediate 
conditions. The greater their number, the easier it is to make reliable inductive 
inferences that can be shared across different sites with the minimum of ‘tinkering’. 
This effect is appreciated by engineers, ‘About half of the Institution of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers annual list of the 200 top innovations is devoted to 
testing equipment’ (Constant 1980:276). Since experimental conditions are 
created locally, their co-ordination requires the use of specialised technology, 
shared tinkering or standard operating procedures.
Local variations in experimental practice and instruments can mean that comparison 
is not possible; protocols or standards between tests may be different, accuracy 
and relevance may be checked with different instruments. With low comparability, 
the interpretation of testing data becomes subject to more social negotiation as 
interests are able to form around particular trajectories. Governance structures are 
often challenged with co-ordinating such instrumentalities to improve comparability. 
Under standardised conditions, knowledge can accumulate quickly because 
there is less to debate. Governance plays an important role in developing and 
selecting between potential operational trajectories (Nelson 2008b). It is possible 
to conduct development along parallel trajectories but this can become difficult if 
costs escalate, so choices must be made along the way.
Leadership of, and co-ordination between, research and development groups 
ensures that the new knowledge growth does not remain fragmented, but is 
accumulated, assimilated and integrated (Chataway, Brusoni et al. 2007). 
Instrumentalities are a shared utility that form an important part of the invisible 
research infrastructure, and becomes embedded within norms and traditions of 
the technological community (Constant 1980:8).
When understanding vaccine innovation, two central ideas are important: a 
social vision and a testing regime. The social vision becomes most significant 
when a disease concept and its causal agent are established. Social problems 
become more specific technological problems as operational principles are 
7devised. A testing regime develops the operational principles with three 
elements: intermediate conditions, instrumentalities and institutions. Intermediate 
conditions are points in between the simplified but unrealistic conditions that 
facilitate learning and the realistic but complex conditions that are most relevant 
to practice. Instrumentalities allow the creation of these intermediate conditions, 
in which knowledge can grow reliably. Institutions ensure knowledge does not 
remain fragmented and accumulates along intermediate conditions and cross-
sectionally across different groups working at the same point.
83. THE ROAD TO POLIOMYELITIS VACCINES
This case proceeds in three parts. The introductory part explains why poliomyelitis 
drew attention and became recognised as a problem. It describes the construction 
of a vision, led by a US President, as well as by scientists establishing a cause for 
the disease. The second part describes some of the failures and barriers faced 
by researchers, which might otherwise be overlooked in a history of poliomyelitis 
successes. The third part describes the development of a testing regime, which 
involved developing instrumentalities to create intermediate conditions and 
strengthening institutions for accumulating knowledge.
THE EMERGENCE OF A PROBLEM AND 
THE VISION OF A SOLUTION
Poliomyelitis was eventually given its name as a specific disease in the middle 
of the 19th century6  after physicians learnt to associate a distinctive paralysis 
with damaged spinal cords in children. This formed the basis for early clinical 
recognition (Paul 1971:26). It was sometimes fatal, and the damage was found to 
be inflammation (itis) of the grey (polios) matter of the spinal cord (myelos) (Paul 
1971:7). Initially, it was thought to be caused by teething (Carter 1965:8), perhaps 
due to the temporal proximity of the events. The clustering of cases in single 
households however, suggested the disease was of an infectious nature.
6 The earliest evidence of poliomyelitis is an Egyptian stone carving depicting a man 
with a deformed limb dated to 1500BC (see Paul 1971:15 for an image of the stone). The 
disease was given a series of changing names as the characterisation of the condition 
became increasingly specific. For example, names range from morning paralysis in 
1843, to tephromyelitis anterior acuta parenchymatose in 1872 and later, infantile paralysis 
(Paul 1971:5).
9A VISION FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNITY
In 1908, Landsteiner and Popper, showed more conclusively that poliomyelitis 
was spread by an infectious agent (Robbins 2004:17). The researchers caused 
monkeys to develop the disease by inoculating their brains with spinal cord tissue 
taken from a human who had died of the disease (Paul 1971:98)7. The following 
year, Flexner and Lewis went further by passing the human infection from 
monkey to monkey (Carter 1965:9). Although the infectious agent responsible 
for poliomyelitis could not be seen under microscope, the flurry of experiments 
between 1908 and 1910 showed it to be a living parasitic microorganism8, able to 
reproduce in the cells of its victims.
The search for a specific infectious agent, likely to have been informed 
by Koch’s postulates (Paul 1971:100; Mullan 1989), allowed public health 
officials to be less concerned with intractable environmental tasks such as 
cleaning up the city, ridding it of pests and animals, promoting personal 
hygiene and sanitation, or dealing with overcrowded slums, hunger 
and poverty (Tomes 1990). The establishment of a causal agent also 
helped initiate a shift in disease management policies away from quarantinism 
(Baldwin 1999).
For the technical community, the discovery of a disease causing agent for 
poliomyelitis allowed them to search for past experience of similar situations. 
They were able to conceive a solution based on Jenner’s and Pasteur’s vaccines, 
which tackle diseases known by then to also be caused by a specific agent9. 
However, beyond having a target to take aim at, the operational principles 
that such a poliomyelitis vaccine might exploit remained unknown, and further 
knowledge about the epidemiology of the poliovirus was needed before a vaccine 
was a technical possibility.
7 It is important to note that the animal model was not a perfect simulation of humans. The 
monkeys only contracted paralytic poliomyelitis if the agent was injected directly into their 
central nervous systems (Paul 1971:98).
8 The infectious agent was recognised to be a virus because it could pass through the finest 
filters (Carter 1965). The relationship between infectious agent and disease is relatively 
simple for poliomyelitis. A contrasting example is the relationship between HIV and the 
onset of AIDS, where SIV infection, not HIV infection, is needed to bring about AIDS-like 
disease in monkey models.
9 The poliomyelitis researcher Hortsmann (1985) wrote, ‘Recovering the etiologic agent of 
a disease immediately conjures up dreams of developing a vaccine to prevent the infection. 
This was as true in 1908 when Landsteiner reported the isolation of poliovirus as it is today, 
when the identification of HTLV3 [the early term for HIV] as the probable cause of AIDS 
burst on the horizon.’
10
By 1910 it was demonstrated that monkeys surviving poliomyelitis often resisted 
re-infection, and their blood contained a substance that neutralised the virus in a 
test tube (Paul 1971:108). This served to reinforce the vision by offering further 
hints about the possibility of a vaccine. In 1911 Flexner issued a press release 
declaring that within six months10 a specific remedy would be announced, ‘We 
have already discovered how to prevent the disease, and the achievement of 
a cure, I may conservatively say, is not far distant’ (full press release in Paul 
1971:116). For Flexner, all that was needed was to turn the laboratory discovery 
into a fully developed and tested technology. He was appealing to a common 
intuition in which the difficulties of moving from science (of ‘establishing cause’) 
to innovation (of a vaccine) were underestimated. Perhaps this was necessary 
in order to sustain the belief that the vision or proposed idea is not ridiculed as a 
technological impossibility11.
There were several early obstacles to establishing operational principles. 
Laboratory diagnosis of poliomyelitis was dependent on testing spinal fluid, 
obtained through a painful and dangerous procedure that few physicians could 
perform. So serum harvested from the blood of sick patients or animals remained 
scarce and unreliable, and was dependent on skilled people (Paul 1971; Rogers 
1992). As such, accumulating knowledge about the properties of the virus (and 
viruses generally) was slow. Little was known about how poliomyelitis established 
itself in man (pathogenesis), or how it was transmitted (Robbins 2004:17).
It is now known that various types of poliovirus may enter through 
the mouth and nose from droplets such as saliva or microscopic pieces 
of faeces (Ohka and Nomoto 2001; Racaniello 2006). The virus then 
slides into the gut where it reproduces. Normally the immune system can 
limit this infection before it causes serious disease, but on rare occasions 
(in 1-2% of infected people) the virus travels through the blood and 
into the central nervous system, causing meningitis. Paralysis occurs 
only if the virus then enters nerve cells (Ohka and Nomoto 2001; Racaniello 
2006).
This model of polio-pathogenesis accounts for the transmission of its immunity, 
as well as the patterns of disease spread during epidemics. Before poliomyelitis 
epidemics emerged, poliovirus was usually spread by faecal contact. Paradoxically, 
increasing sanitation and better standards of hygiene promoted the spread of 
disease because children were less exposed to mild forms making them more 
10 A similar, more public, announcement was made by Margaret Heckler, US secretary 
of health, about the time needed (a couple of years) to develop an AIDS vaccine (Panem 
1988:25; Shilts 1987:451).
11 The eminent polio researcher John Paul concedes, ‘[Flexner] can be forgiven for making 
mistakes about poliomyelitis’ (1971:125).
11
susceptible to severe infection (and also because mothers did not pass immunity 
to foetuses12).
The model postulated by Flexner in 1913 was significantly different and, in short, 
mistaken (Rogers 1992). In this incorrect model, poliomyelitis was caused by only 
one type of virus, which travelled through the sinuses directly to the brain and 
spine, and grew in living nervous tissue. These assumptions led to problematic 
inferences. First, it mistakenly led researchers down the path of aiming to culture 
(grow) the virus in nervous tissue, rather than any other kind of culture medium. 
Second, if the poliovirus did not enter the bloodstream, there was little point in 
trying to put any antibody there. Furthermore, monkeys that recovered from the 
disease did not develop noticeable amounts of antibody in their blood until long 
after recovery. Antibodies were therefore seen as a by-product of illness rather 
than of central significance to immunity.
The early work that followed Landsteiner and Flexner was expensive and 
produced unclear results. Experiments were often confusing because 
researchers did not know they were dealing with multiple types of virus at the 
same time. Furthermore, the only polio-susceptible animal was the monkey, ‘a 
cranky, expensive creature, which in those days (prior to antibiotics) had a way of 
succumbing to other diseases before the researcher could measure its responses 
to polio. No laboratory combined sufficient interest with enough funds to buy and 
maintain all the monkeys needed for thorough study of the poliovirus and the 
disease it caused’ (Carter 1965:19). Apart from a few researchers like Flexner 
and Lewis, the consensus of the scientific community in 1913 (and up to 1935) 
was that a vaccine was possible and desirable, but not likely (Carter 1965:58; 
Paul 1971:113).
FINDING WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE VISION
By 1916, the annual incidence of paralytic poliomyelitis in the US was over 27,000, 
killing more than 7,000. New York, in particular, was badly hit with about a third 
of the disease burden (Rogers 1992:10). Reported cases had never exceeded 
7.9 per 100,000 but in 1916 the rate jumped to 28.5 (Paul 1971:148; Rogers 
1992:10). Hospitals refused to admit cases for fear of infecting others, and some 
cities began insect control programmes with DDT whilst others impounded cats 
and dogs, all of which authorities mistakenly thought could transmit the infectious 
agent discovered by Landsteiner (Paul 1971:149, 291). Parents sealed windows 
and refused to let children play outside (Oshinsky 2005). By 1953, poliomyelitis 
12 However, Immunoglobulin A, which contains antibodies, is passed on to newborns in the 
colostrums in their mothers’ milk (Chase 1982).
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afflicted more than 20 per 100,000 (Robbins 2004:17).
Although the rate was not as high as some other diseases, such as measles, much 
public concern was generated by the media portrayal of poliomyelitis because of 
its seasonal occurrence, its disfiguring nature and its propensity for paralysing 
the respiratory muscles (Oshinsky 2005). The disease was highly visible because 
paralysed patients often needed help breathing with large apparatus dubbed ‘the 
iron lung’ (Paul 1971:327). In addition, the disease was visible to all social classes 
because, unlike other leading causes of infant mortality and infectious diseases 
(such as tuberculosis), it was not restricted to the poor. Given Landsteiner’s 
finding, public health officials are likely to have known that the middle and upper 
classes could not be insulated from poliomyelitis very well using current methods 
(such as quarantine).
In 1921, Franklin Roosevelt13 was struck by poliomyelitis (Carter 1965:11; Paul 
1971:301; Gallagher 1985; Oshinsky 2005). Roosevelt’s condition altered public 
perception of poliomyelitis and boosted scientific research. His misfortune was 
beneficial to poliomyelitis victims and those with other disabilities, at a time when 
physical handicaps were judged harshly. Many afflicted individuals were hidden by 
families (Longmore 1987). An influential orthopaedic text of the time supported the 
idea that disabilities are punishments from God, stating, ‘…a cripple is detestable 
in character, a menace and burden to society, who is only apt to graduate into the 
mendicant and criminal classes…’ (Longmore 1987:357).
Roosevelt’s public relations were carefully coordinated so that he would appear 
more like a triumphant hero despite being burdened with physical limitations; 
this significantly contributed to the transforming structure of disabled identity 
(Gallagher 1985). Even so, no photographs of Roosevelt in a wheelchair were 
made public and what Gallagher (1985) calls ‘FDR’s magnificent deception’ was 
kept secret. In 1924, after it was reported in newspapers that he bathed in Warm 
Springs Georgia to ease his paralysis, many other sufferers made their way there. 
Roosevelt spent two thirds of his personal fortune renovating and expanding it to 
become the Warm Springs Foundation (Gallagher 1985). It was directed by his 
former law partner, Basil O’Connor, whose commitment was reinforced after his 
daughter died from poliomyelitis (Oshinsky 2005:271).
In 1934 Roosevelt staged nationwide charity balls on his birthday ‘to dance so 
others may walk’ (Carter 1965:14) to relieve the debts accruing at Warm Springs 
(Rose 2003). Given the stock market crash of 1929, the campaign achieved extra-
13 Although Roosevelt’s presidency did not begin until 1933, he had by then already risen 
to national prominence. He was born into a wealthy and powerful family. In 1905 he married 
his cousin, who was the niece of the then President Theodore Roosevelt. By 1920, he had 
won his party’s Vice-presidential nomination (Gallagher 1985).
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ordinary success (Rose 2003). It raised $1m that year14, $0.75m the following 
year and it reserved $100,000 to ‘stimulate and further the meritorious work being 
done in the field of infantile paralysis’ (Carter 1965:14,15 and 18). The first sixteen 
research grants totalled $250,000, one of which, for $65,000, was distributed to 
Maurice Brodie (Carter 1965:20; Benison 1967:179).
BRODIE-KOLMER VACCINE FAILURES: A WEAK 
TESTING REGIME IN NEED OF STRENGTHENING
Part of Flexner’s bold optimism was based on the successes of tetanus and 
diphtheria vaccines, which by 1910 had rapidly saved millions of lives15. This 
passive immunisation was achieved by using immune sera drawn from the blood 
of horses previously immunised with graded doses of bacteria. Flexner and Lewis 
attempted to repeat the achievement with polioviruses but had to report ‘the failure 
to produce neutralising serum in the horse… [it] displayed no power whatever to 
inhibit the action of the virus’ (cited in Chase 1982:302). Poliovirus could not 
be grown in horses, or any other non-primate animals16. Further research and 
development would have to involve either humans or monkeys.
FAILURE OF ‘WITCHES’ BREW’
Despite the confusing data emerging from monkeys, the overall vision was strong 
and stable enough for two investigators to overlook the problems. They envisaged 
rudimentary operational principles and wanted to refine them into a vaccine by 
testing them promptly. In 1936, they independently conducted field trials of ill-
conceived vaccines prepared from spinal cords of infected monkeys (Chase 
1982; Robbins 2004). Brodie and Park used a formalin-treated preparation of 
mashed up spinal cord, whilst Kolmer used live virus from spinal cords which 
he treated with chemicals and refrigeration to achieve immunity. In retrospect 
Kolmer’s was probably the more dangerous of the two, described by some as ‘a 
veritable witches’ brew’ (Paul 1971:258).
14 All dollar figures have not been adjusted for inflation.
15 For example, the United States’ death rate for diphtheria halved between 1900 and 1909 
(Chase 1982:302).
16 Although, in 1939, a poliovirus strain was adapted for certain rodents, its growth was 
limited and rare (Robbins 2004:19; Paul 1971:276). Humans and monkeys seemed the only 
alternatives.
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Using what Paul (1971) refers to as ‘kitchen chemistry’, the two hurried their 
vaccines into perceived readiness, each fearing the other would succeed first. 
The rivalry was perhaps all the more intense since Kolmer was not funded by 
Warm Springs money. The failure killed and paralysed many of 12,000 children he 
‘vaccinated’ (Paul 1971)17. These childhood deaths stifled vaccine development18. 
The impact of the experience traumatised researchers, sapped enthusiasm, and 
sparked ‘a wave of revulsion against human vaccination attempts in poliomyelitis’ 
that lasted for two decades (Paul 1971:260).
LEARNING FROM FAILURE WITH A TESTING REGIME
The failed efforts are indicative of the norms and traditions of those testers 
(Constant 1980:8). Vaccinology was seen largely as an empirical art of producing 
effects without necessarily knowing why those effects are caused (Nightingale 
2004:1272). For example, smallpox and rabies vaccines had been developed 
without formal identification and characterisation of their infectious agents. How 
or why a vaccine protected a human was relevant but not all important to the 
purpose of the operational principle.
But if the vaccine did not work in a single attempt, as in this instance, the testing 
regime needs to be able to ensure that researchers have a way of finding out why 
the test failed. The knowledge generated from these trials did not accumulate 
and further social investment in the testing regime would be needed. The failures 
served to highlight that more systematically gained know-how was needed before 
injecting people.
The testing regime was impeded by three sets of difficulties. Firstly, feedback 
loops were weak because there was so little virus available to work with. Few 
were skilled at diagnosing infection quickly by extracting spinal fluid, so most 
researchers had to wait for symptoms when testing for any immunity. Secondly, 
iterations, refinements and adjustments could not be made easily, because 
monkeys were so difficult and expensive. Brodie only tested his vaccine on 20 
monkeys before trialling with 300 children whilst Kolmer only tested on a few 
monkeys, himself, his children and 22 others before distributing the vaccine 
to physicians around the country (Paul 1971). Thirdly, the community did not 
establish the types of poliomyelitis virus they were working with before trialling. 
17 In a public health association meeting, Kolmer is reported to have said ‘Gentlemen, this is 
one time I wish the floor would open up and swallow me’ (Paul 1971:260; Chase 1982:284). 
Many have alleged that Brodie killed himself four years after the trials (Paul 1971:261), but 
his death certificate only offers thrombosis as the cause (Chase 1982:284).
18 It is interesting that in 1971 Paul considers this ‘blown out of proportion’.
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Each of these three issues needed to be addressed for successful vaccine 
innovation as the next section shows.
The failures moved Roosevelt to abandon the Birthdays Balls after 1937 
and rename the Warm Springs Foundation the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis (Rose 2003). Its mission was not just to ‘make every 
effort to ensure that every possible research agency in the country 
is adequately financed to carry out investigations into the cause of 
infantile paralysis and the methods by which it may be prevented’ 
(Carter 1965:15). But significantly, Roosevelt also announced that the 
Foundation would, ‘lead, direct, and unify the fight of every phase of this sickness’ 
(Markel 2005:1408) [my italics]. It would form a major institutional part of the 
testing regime for poliomyelitis vaccine development, and it formed a focal point 
for the co-ordination of resources – fiscal, labour, skills and materials. 
The first fund raiser held by the Foundation was a radio promotion19, which 
received over $1.8m in a week, and with each new campaign the proceeds 
increased. For example, the 1945 receipts totalled $18m, and 1955 contributions 
totalled $67m (Carter 1965:26). Thus, a major source of funding was established 
for the research and development of vaccines. Between 1938 and 1962, the 
Foundation’s overall income was $630m. 59% was spent on hospital and patient 
support (treatment and care), 13% was spent on fund-raising and advertising, 8% 
on educational programmes, and 11% ($69m) was spent on vaccine research 
and development (Paul 1971:312).
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MORE 
SOPHISTICATED TESTING REGIME
In 1947, Harry Weaver was appointed as Director of Research at the Foundation. 
With the support of O’Connor, and to the resistance of many others, he went 
about directing poliomyelitis research in the style of large war time projects. 
Weaver began by inviting leading poliomyelitis researchers to conferences and 
had the Foundation publish their remarks in regular reports (Carter 1965; Smith 
1990). He instituted a series of round table discussions with the Foundation’s 
grantees to educate himself about poliomyelitis and to ‘encourage communication 
and intellectual cross-fertilisation in a field notable for its lack of both’ (Carter 
1965:57).
19 One of the radio promoters enthused ‘we could ask people to send their dimes directly to 
the White House…think what a thrill people would get…we could call it the march of dimes’ 
(Carter 1965:16).
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Weaver therefore played an important co-ordinating role between different 
groups of scientists, and with O’Connor, he acted as an intermediary between 
the scientific community and the wider public. The Foundation was entrusted 
with co-ordinating the scientific community and preventing the failures of the 
1930s vaccines resurfacing, but it was also constantly in the media spotlight and 
funded by door-to-door collections. The Foundation mediated between scientific 
concerns for incremental advances of certainty and public demand for quick 
tangible advances.
The tensions between these two aims became apparent to Weaver. The round 
table discussions and conferences led Weaver to the view that whilst researchers 
who are free of direction establish more certainties about a disease, they often 
choose to investigate questions of little practical application. Weighing up the field 
Weaver wrote to O’Connor:
Only an appalling few…were really trying to solve the problem of poliomyelitis in 
man….If real progress were to be made, more exact methods of research would 
have to be clearly defined, procedures and techniques would have to be developed 
to permit attaining those objectives and individual groups of workers would have to 
sacrifice to some extent their inherent right to roam the field, and concentrate their 
energies on one, or at most, a few of the objectives (Carter 1965:57).
Prior to Weaver’s appointment, the National Foundation simply funded projects 
that independent researchers chose (Benison 1967; Smith 1990), similar to many 
of the foundations of today (Arnold 2005; Boddington 2008). Weaver believed 
that part of the problem was allowing this form of investigator-initiated research 
to dominate the research agenda at the expense of more carefully co-ordinated 
research. As Weaver was a doctor of philosophy and not of medicine (Carter 
1965:58), he set up a Scientific Research Committee with whom he could direct 
research at the technical level. The head of this Committee was Dr Thomas 
Rivers, who shared Weaver’s view of targeted research:
During the first year of the Foundation’s existence, the Scientific Research Committee 
received any number of applications from individual investigators and, while many 
were worthwhile in themselves, together they did not seem to be going anywhere. 
They were too haphazard for a program and I thought that the Foundation would 
be better served if a committee surveyed the field of polio research and blocked out 
problems that needed solution. With such a guide in hand, I felt that the committee 
should seek out the men and institutions capable of researching such problems and 
support them with grants (Benison 1967:231).
Several members of the committee didn’t like my idea... They felt that the 
Foundation would be better advised if it simply continued to give grants to competent 
investigators of accredited institutions who voluntarily expressed their wish to do 
research into causes and prevention of polio (Benison 1967:232). 
For example, one prominent Foundation grantee wrote ‘Are we now employees 
who are ordered about?’ (Paul 1971:405).
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Despite their resistance, Rivers and Weaver led the enterprise ‘by seeking out 
men and institutions’ to undertake an 11 point research plan (listed in Benison 
1967:229). Three of the impediments to vaccine development were tackled directly. 
Firstly, Weaver felt that a monkey shortage had delayed poliomyelitis research. 
Secondly, it was not possible to grow viruses successfully in the laboratory; they 
had to be grown in the brains of monkeys. This was time consuming, expensive 
and of low yield. Thirdly, it was not known how many wild types of poliovirus 
existed against which a prospective poliomyelitis vaccine would need to protect.
‘MONKEY BUSINESS’: CO-ORDINATING THE 
SUPPLY OF TESTING RESOURCES
Weaver complained to O’Connor that ‘experiment after experiment had been 
botched by scientists who used too few monkeys or made the error of reusing 
monkeys whose systems were misleadingly immune to one or another type of the 
virus.’ O’Connor resolved, ‘We’ll go into the monkey business’ (Carter 1965:73).
After decades of trying, researchers had been unsuccessful in conferring 
poliomyelitis to mice, rats, rabbits and other small, inexpensive and readily 
available laboratory animals (Ren, Costantini et al. 1990). It was possible to 
infect monkeys20, but working with them was not easy (Robbins 2004). Monkeys 
required special animal quarters, rather than the usual cages or bins for smaller 
laboratory animals, and an entirely different kind of care from that of smaller 
animals (Paul 1971:101). ‘Salk had spent a significant proportion of his time 
arranging the housing and feeding of his monkeys, as well as placating the 
assistants who had to work with them’ (Smith 1990:123). Skilled technicians were 
needed to clean, feed and look after monkeys. Technicians needed to be skilled 
in handling, exercising and observing their behaviour whilst contending with the 
constant threat of bites and thumps, and risks of disease21.
Despite these difficulties, laboratory demand for monkeys outstripped supply. 
Capture of wild monkeys was not always simple. Cynomolgous monkeys suffered 
from poliomyelitis in ways that were close to human and their temperament made 
them easier to work with, but their scarcity meant they were expensive to import 
20 The ethics of using primates were probably less considered than would be today.
21 The possibility of contracting disease from monkeys was frightening enough for Salk to 
request from the Foundation ‘a $10,000 life insurance policy for each of the individuals in 
this extra-hazardous work’ (Carter 1965:75). One physician working with monkeys suffered 
a fatal case of encephalitis. The Foundation referred Salk to University administration on his 
request for insurance against such fatalities.
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from the Philippines and Indonesia (Time 1954; Smith 1990). Rhesus monkeys 
were more abundant in India, but they are sacred to Hindus, regarded as 
incarnations of the monkey God Hanuman (Lutgendorf 2007). Only Muslims, (or 
other non-Hindus) would catch monkeys and then only during specific seasons, 
for example not over the month of Ramadan. Supplies were also susceptible 
to Indian government regulations and restrictions rooted in Hindu religious 
pressure groups, fears about what they were being used for, or concerns about 
mistreatment in transit (Time 1958). Many researchers complained to their 
suppliers about these monkeys arriving dead or diseased. ‘In addition to the three 
monkeys from the first shipment that were dead on arrival (in one instance there 
was obvious head trauma), we have lost three more. I wonder… whether you 
will replace the animals that die… The monkeys of the 18th seem to be much 
cleaner, more content and evidently well fed; however they seem very small’ 
(Salk correspondence quoted in Carter 1965:75).
O’Connor established Okatie Farms to address these problems. Weaver would 
organise massive monkey ‘airlifts’ from India and Indonesia (Time 1954:7) and 
have them sent directly to the Farms. There they would rest and recuperate from 
any diseases before being dispatched to laboratories. In this way, the Farms 
saved laboratory time, effort and space.
Smith (1990:121) describes the Farms as ‘a rehabilitation facility that was also a 
centre for research in the solution of problems nobody else much cared about.’ 
The Farms developed carefully formulated dry monkey feed in conjunction with 
researchers like Salk, ‘I am wondering if the low cost of your [monkey] diet is not 
due to the fact that there has been some substitution in content’ (Carter 1965:76). 
The Farms also provided instructions on how to mix the feed and tips on when 
and how to get the monkeys to eat it. Among the tips were to divide the rations 
so that the monkeys would not have enough in one go ‘to fling around and mash 
into each other’s ears and stuff down drains and such like’ (Smith 1990:122). 
In all, there are considerably long correspondences regarding the minutiae of 
delivering, feeding, handling and disposing of monkeys (Carter 1965).
TISSUE CULTURING: A NEW TECHNIQUE 
FOR GROWING VIRUS
The effort to develop better methods for propagating the virus by various 
investigators continued throughout the 1930s, but failed to find a solution (Robbins 
2004). By the end of the decade two exceptional groups reported the growth of 
poliovirus in cultures of human embryonic brain tissue, however they failed to 
take the technique further with cells from non-nervous system tissues (Sabin and 
Olitsky 1936; Burnet and Jackson 1940; Paul 1971:373). Robbins (2004) laments 
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on their efforts, ‘Unfortunately, they did not pursue these findings; otherwise the 
vaccine might have been available almost a decade earlier.’
Their failure to persist was in part due to the orthodoxy that poliovirus was 
essentially a nervous system virus, which occasionally spilled over into the blood. 
Unfortunately their findings served only to reinforce the notion that poliovirus was 
more neurotropic than it really was (Abe, Ota et al. 1995). Thus it was thought 
that a poliomyelitis vaccine was impractical because, if it would only grow in the 
nervous systems of monkeys, it was impossible to remove all of the animal-nerve 
cells when harvesting the virus for vaccine preparation. This implied that a vaccine 
would be very dangerous because injections of foreign nervous tissue can cause 
encephalitis (fatal allergic inflammations of the brain) (Rogers 1992).
However, some other Foundation grantees made significant findings about virus 
growth. Paul and Trask observed the presence of virus in human faeces, implying 
it could reproduce in the alimentary tract (Paul 1971:281). In 1940, Bodian and 
Howe gave chimpanzees poliomyelitis by feeding them the virus and, in 1947, 
Melnick and Hortsmann demonstrated that the animals developed antibody and 
resistance to re-infection after such feeding (Paul 1971:287). This provided strong 
indications that poliomyelitis was an intestinal infection.
Then the Foundation funded a more persistent effort on tissue culturing than 
before. The Foundation provided funds for training personnel to acquire practice 
and skills in culturing22. It helped overcome difficulties in sourcing the embryonic 
tissue by keeping laboratories in close contact with local maternity hospitals23.
The Foundation commissioned a group at Harvard University, who had been 
developing culturing techniques on mumps virus and chicken pox virus with 
considerable success, and supplied them with abundant poliovirus and funding 
(Chase 1982:292). In this attempt, Enders, Weller and Robbins succeeded in 
making the breakthrough most eagerly sought by the Foundation by cultivating 
poliovirus in human non-nervous tissues (in human embryonic skin muscle). It 
was not long before poliomyelitis was found to propagate in cells from a variety 
of tissues (Robbins 2004:18).
22 In order to achieve good yields, cultures have to be kept at precise temperatures, in very 
clean containers, of the right shape and size, with the right kind of lids and stoppers (Smith 
1990).
23 Embryonic tissue grows much faster than that of adults, and is less prone to disease, 
so it is the preferred tissue for culturing with. Given the contentious nature of acquiring 
such tissue, the Foundation often could only acquire small quantities of foreskins from 
circumcisions of newborn boys. Placentas, miscarriages and still-born tissue were also 
used but their supply was even less predictable (Smith 1990).
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Initially, the scientist John Paul undervalued the breakthrough. ‘For the moment, 
I was stupidly unaware of the implications that this finding held. At least it did 
not appear to me as an electrifying piece of news. Instead, I visualised it as just 
another repetition of the results which Sabin and Olitsky had reported twelve 
years earlier…However remarkable their technical triumph was, it hardly seemed 
to me to be a trick... How utterly mistaken was my preliminary judgment of this 
discovery to prove!’ (Paul 1971:373). Their technique marked the start of the 
tissue culture era.
Tissue culture transformed the testing regime by providing a safer and simpler 
environment to learn in, with tighter feedback loops with new knowledge derived 
from tests accumulating quickly. Firstly, the tissue culture era did not simply 
represent a method of growing more of the virus. It was a source of better quality 
virus because it was relatively free of protein and, crucially, it could be free of 
nerve cells, which meant it removed the safety concern of encephalitis (Robbins 
2004:18).
Secondly, tissue cultures drastically reduced the need for monkeys which 
were being imported at great financial and temporal expense (Chase 1982). In 
1953, human embryonic tissue was substituted with the testicles or kidneys of 
monkeys, a single one of which, according to Salk, could provide enough tissue 
culture for two hundred test tubes (Carter 1965:114). One monkey, then, did what 
used to require two hundred. ‘Worse than the costs of buying and maintaining 
these animals were the temporal limits they placed on the investigative progress’ 
(Chase 1982:286). With the need for experimental animals vastly reduced, 
feedback loops were much shorter. More ideas could be tested, and the results of 
such tests could be assessed quicker. Thus testing became dramatically cheaper 
and quicker.
Thirdly, tissue cultures were used to set up standards and criteria. It was 
observed that early in the course of poliovirus cultivation, infected cells were 
rapidly destroyed (Chase 1982:292; Robbins 2004:19). This cytopathic effect 
was used as an indicator of viral replication, meaning that the presence of 
viruses were observable with microscopes rather than with monkeys. With some 
technical modifications, tissue cultures were also used for virus titration, antibody 
quantification, virus isolation from clinical specimens and antigenic typing of virus 
isolates (Paul 1971:374; Robbins 2004:19).
Robbins (2004:18) reflects, ‘There is no ready explanation as to why [our] 
experiments succeeded whereas those of Sabin and Olitsky did not. The principal 
technical difference was that, in Enders’ laboratory, the cultures were maintained 
for a longer time, with periodic changes of nutrient medium…’ Sabin himself 
acknowledged this at a Danish conference (Carter 1965:115). Persistence and 
simply trying harder and for longer, however, were not the only reasons they 
succeeded. Rivers also saw the experiments as very similar, as he recounted, 
‘[Sabin and Olitsky’s] work was so meticulously done that I believed it was 
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absolutely correct… I read [Enders’] paper over and over looking for a flaw. In the 
end I had to believe he was right. It wasn’t easy because I damn well knew that 
Olitsky and Sabin were also right’ (Carter 1965:90). But Rivers realised that whilst 
Enders was supported by the Foundation in the form of grants and plenty of virus 
supply, the other groups were not. He reasoned that Sabin and Olitsky’s technical 
downfall had been the virus they had used. As Sabin subsequently proved, 
possibly at Rivers’ suggestion, the MV virus was the only poliovirus that would not 
grow in non-nervous tissue. Rivers noted, ‘If Olistky and Sabin had worked with 
another strain… the chances are that… we would have had a breakthrough of 
major proportions in making a vaccine [much earlier]’ (Carter 1965:91). So Rivers 
felt that working without a clear cataloguing of the various poliomyelitis strains 
had impeded vaccine development by delaying tissue culturing.
VIRUS TYPING: $1.37M FOR A ‘DULL’ 
AND ‘MENIAL’ PROGRAM
In 1948, Weaver pushed forward this important, but theoretically unexciting, 
strategic research project. For a long time it was suspected that multiple strains 
of poliovirus existed24 but to establish this with more certainty would involve a 
long and systematic effort. It would entail immense cost in terms of laboratory 
space, monkeys, technical personnel, and equipment. Weaver was aware that 
senior researchers would be reluctant to take on such ‘drudgery’ (Carter 1965:61) 
because it would involve giving over their laboratories and several years to 
mechanical and boring work.
John Paul (1971:318) says of the co-operative typing program, ‘This was not 
exploration; rather it was the application of established methods to solve a specific 
problem. In the planning and implementation of this type of medical “research and 
development”, the foundation was at its best’ (Paul’s speech marks).
The protocol of immunological testing was difficult, imprecise and time consuming. 
A group of monkeys was infected with a strain of poliovirus, say Type I virus. After 
waiting for them to get sick, and waiting for them to recover (if they did recover), 
they were then challenged with ‘standard’ doses of unknown viruses and their 
responses were charted. If this group of monkeys that was infected with known 
Type I virus and then subsequently infected with a virus of unknown type, got 
sick again on the second infection, one infers that the unknown virus is a different 
strain from Type I, say Type II or Type III. This different strain of virus can then be 
24 There were indications that monkeys immune to one strain of poliovirus could still be 
infected by another strain (Burnet 1931, cited in Chase 1982:284).
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injected into another group of monkeys known to have recovered from infection 
with Type II virus. If there were no ill effects, the unknown strain can be confirmed 
as Type II, but if the monkeys got sick the procedure is repeated with another 
group of monkeys known to resist Type III viral infection so that the unknown virus 
can eventually be confirmed as a Type III virus strain when the monkey shows no 
ill effects (Smith 1990).
The whole protocol, even when executed perfectly and with a lot of luck, would 
have required a lot of monkeys to confirm immunological test results. But 
there are many inaccuracies in making the deductions. Preparing ‘standard’ 
doses, also known as challenge stock, was a delicate, time consuming and 
frustratingly immense job because the viruses differed greatly in pathogenicity 
and infectivity. Thus the standard dose was significantly different for just 
about every virus strain and it could be miscalculated easily given such high 
variance. Too weak a dose and one might mistake a very mild infection for 
prior immunity. Too strong a dose and the monkeys end up dead, which would 
reduce the efficiency of monkey use. To guard against such miscalculations, 
each step of the process needed to be repeated with dozens of monkey 
groups (Smith 1990). Only then can a challenge stock database be compiled 
and shared with other groups as a sort of ‘public good’ of knowledge for further 
research.
Weaver set up an eminent advisory committee to lead the virus typing project 
but the task itself did not inspire any of them so Weaver went looking for other 
young and fresh researchers. An ambitious Jonas Salk had just set up a new 
laboratory of his own after having worked on a formalin-inactivated influenza25 
vaccine with his mentor, Thomas Francis, for the US Armed Forces (Carter 
1965:35; Galambos and Sewell 1995:47). Salk was looking for his laboratory’s 
first grant when Francis encouraged him to take on lucrative work being offered 
by the Foundation (Carter 1965; Smith 1990). This project was seen by Salk as 
‘a dull but dependable investment that would provide a regular dividend of money 
for his lab’ (Salk quoted in Smith 1990:117). Smith writes ‘The Foundation’s virus 
typing program would be menial but liberating [Salk] told himself – a simple job… 
and a means to expand both the size and the equipment of his laboratory in 
ways that would remain long after… The Foundation directors who had chosen 
Salk’s laboratory didn’t mind a bit of careerist greed as long as it got the job done’ 
(1990:110).
The large scale experiment spanned four universities and two years, classified 
over 200 clinical strains of poliovirus isolated from patients all over the world, cost 
25 The Army were interested in influenza vaccines because more people died from the 
influenza epidemic of 1918 than were killed in combat (Crosby 1976).
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$1.37m and used up 30,000 monkeys26 imported at great expense (Chase 1982). 
It showed conclusively that there were three, and only three27, immunologically 
distinct types of poliomyelitis virus (Bodian 1949).
This was crucial information for developing a vaccine that was fully protective 
and not just partially protective against local strains. The virus typing set another 
standard for all future vaccine candidates to be compared against. Indeed when 
successful results were announced to the public in Francis’ final evaluation 
report, it was in terms of this standard; Salk’s vaccine was ‘60-70% effective 
against disease caused by Type I virus and 90% or more effective against that 
of Type II and Type III virus…’ (Carter 1965:275). The Foundation also devoted 
significant funds to epidemiological studies that established which of the three 
strains were prevalent and where the strains were distributed across the country. 
Such epidemiological data would be useful in deciding where to locate field trials 
of future vaccines (Paul 1971:357).
26 To put the figure in context, the US Department of Agriculture reported the 
use of 52,000 monkeys, chimpanzees and other primates in 2002 for all R&D 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/ar2002.html 
27 The three strains were named Lansing, Prunhilde and Leon strains (Time, 1953).
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The development of poliomyelitis vaccines was dependent on a vision that needed 
to be convincing not just for the community of technological practitioners, but also 
for wider society. Expectations (van Lente 1993) were constructed by key actors 
from different communities. Landsteiner may have shown an infectious agent 
to which inventive vaccine efforts could be directed, but the social landscape 
was reshaped by President Roosevelt. The relationship between scientists as 
technological-producers, and the public as ‘science’ consumers, was not forged 
until Roosevelt established a specific and dedicated mediating organisation, the 
National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.
A series of names reflecting different syndromes and symptoms became 
increasingly specific and characterised as a distinctive disease, poliomyelitis. 
This initiated an innovation process as Rosenberg (2002) suggested, where 
once a predictable life course was outlined for the disease, it organised social 
and economic resources around the particular phenomenon of poliomyelitis. By 
identifying an infectious agent, Landsteiner allowed the technical community to 
rally around a vision for a vaccine. The technical community had its own set of 
norms and traditions (Constant 1980:8) that were highly focussed on public health 
innovation and establishing operational principles promptly (Polanyi 1958:328; 
Vincenti 1990:209). Flexner’s optimism about the possibility of a timely vaccine 
was publicised to the wider community just as a major poliomyelitis epidemic 
was taking hold. The affliction of Roosevelt added to the perceived importance of 
conquering the disease. Together, these factors helped to mobilise resources and 
attention to poliomyelitis and effectively ‘problematised’ it (Blume 1992).
However, Roosevelt’s involvement is perhaps most pertinent to contemporary 
vaccine innovation issues because the Foundation ensured the cumulative 
growth of technological knowledge through the development of a testing regime. 
The Brodie-Kolmer failures indicated that the testing regime was initially weak. 
Researchers had not learnt enough about the virus, instrumentalities were poorly 
developed and efforts were not well co-ordinated. Knowledge growth was either 
slow or fragmented or both.
In order to accumulate technological knowledge, the Foundation adopted a 
leading role to ensure certain features of the testing regime were developed. 
Weaver ensured that the Foundation worked to open channels for communicating 
research results, encourage the sharing of unpublished data and establish criteria 
and specifications with which to frame those results. It actively fostered knowledge 
integration across research groups and in doing so gained an overview of what 
was needed for innovation. It then directed technological research, sometimes in 
areas seen by scientists as unstimulating. The Foundation’s scientific advisors, 
led by Rivers, commissioned the development of instrumentalities such as 
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tissue culturing, and important epidemiological studies such as identifying and 
classifying the three strains of virus.
The Foundation facilitated such research by finding specific researchers to do 
the work and provided them with funds, virus, tissue and reagents. The need for 
virus and monkeys was met by supporting the development of tissue culturing 
and the establishment of a monkey farm. This allowed more tests to be done in 
intermediate conditions and their results to be fed back quickly. The large project 
to type polioviruses provided helpful knowledge about which strains the vaccine 
would need to provide protection against.
On the one hand, tissue culturing drastically reduced the need for monkeys but 
on the other hand, the virus typing programme offset that reduction and made the 
need for monkeys even more intense than it was before28. Weaver’s careful watch 
on monkey procurement from Asia and O’Connor’s efforts in the establishment 
of Okatie Farms relieved scientists of many of the administrative and handling 
problems associated with monkeys. Once culturing techniques were developed, 
a steady supply of monkeys was secured and the results of a virus typing project 
were established, ideas could be tested quickly and in varying conditions.
The Foundation would then turn its attention to transforming subjective issues of 
vaccine design into more specifiable criteria for vaccine use in human conditions 
rather than in laboratory monkeys. It would also go on to mediate personal 
agendas, conflicts of interests, and manage differences of opinion. It would even 
display the leadership to make the risky and unpopular decision to enter clinical 
trials (Yaqub 2009).
The community was well prepared to appreciate and exploit new ideas and, 
following these key advances, was well positioned to start thinking about how it 
might test and assess them in people. With the chances of making a poliomyelitis 
vaccine much improved, a number of groups were able to work towards that goal 
(Yaqub 2009).
Some significant policy levers can be identified from components of the testing 
regime framework presented in this paper. Instrumentalities, which are made up 
of instruments, skills and capabilities, need to be nurtured and developed because 
they are essential to the manipulation of conditions for learning and developing 
technologies that are reliable. Institutions, which govern vaccine research and 
development, are needed to configure those instrumentalities so that knowledge 
does not remain fragmented, but accumulates towards innovation. This may take 
the form of ensuring the plentiful supply of reagents, consistent animal models, 
test-subjects, and instruments. The work will require skilled personnel and 
28 The Virus typing program alone used 30,000 monkeys – whereas before the program, 
only 17,500 monkeys had been used in total (Carter 1965; Chase 1982).
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experienced vaccinologists, who are allowed to transfer tacit knowledge through 
training for younger researchers.
Policy makers may also consider offering contracted research grants as 
a complement to investigator-initiated research. The development of new 
instrumentalities may require targeted strategic attention. Well funded investigator-
initiated research may yield exquisite science, but contracted grants will ensure 
mundane research is undertaken systematically. The lesson from poliomyelitis 
vaccine development is that both are needed.
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